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Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh 
 
 
Bangladesh has come a long distance in its journey of economic development. When it became 
independent in 1971 following a bloody war, many were skeptical about the country‘s long-term 
economic viability. Some observers predicted a state of perennial aid dependence,
1
 while others 
referred to it as a ―test case of development‖ (Faaland and Parkinson 1976), implying that if a 
country with the myriad problems and challenges of the magnitudes that Bangladesh was facing 
could make development happen, then any country could.  
 
Despite the naysayers‘ gloomy predictions and the widely shared pessimistic outlook, 
Bangladesh has made significant economic and social strides in the last three decades or so of its 
existence: it is no longer considered a basket case. Notwithstanding its large population, the 
country has achieved a measure of food self-sufficiency (although the food-population balance 
remains precarious). In the face of low per capita incomes and widespread illiteracy, it has made 
successful strides toward demographic transition and reduced its population growth rate from 2.5 
percent per year in the 1980s to less than 1.5 percent per year in 2005 (Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics 2007b). In a number of other social indicators, such as infant mortality, life expectancy, 
primary school enrollment, female enrollment in school, and adult literacy, Bangladesh has made 
considerable improvements over the years. With respect to many Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) indicators,
2
 it now compares favorably with India even given the latter‘s higher 
per capita income, higher growth rates, and higher social expenditures per capita (ADB 2006). 
                                                 
1
 At the onset of the Bangladesh liberation war, Henry Kissinger, then U.S. secretary of state,  is said to have 
famously remarked that Bangladesh was going to be a ―basket case‖ and be permanently dependent on foreign aid. 
2
 The MDGs are a set of development targets aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal 
primary education; promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women; reducing child mortality; improving 
maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; and ensuring environmental sustainability. 
These targets, to be achieved by 2015, were set by members of the United Nations during its millennium session in 
2000.  
 3 
Nevertheless, despite this success, Bangladesh is still at a rudimentary stage of economic and 
social transformation. As Sachs (2005, p. 14) notes, it has merely managed ―to place its foot on 
the first rung of the ladder of development.‖  
 
Most economic successes are outcomes of domestic efforts, and Bangladesh is no exception. As 
was the case in the past, Bangladesh‘s future success will depend largely on the quality and 
quantity of its efforts directed at meeting emerging challenges; however, this process can be 
facilitated by external assistance in mobilizing financial resources and improving institutions.  
 
As development theory and empirical experience from other countries suggest, external 
assistance can fill in for lacking resources by (a) augmenting limited domestic savings, (b) 
providing the additional foreign exchange required to finance critical capital requirements and 
imports of raw materials, and (c) assisting with the development of human capital and the 
promotion of domestic capacity. However, as recent history indicates, frequently these potential 
benefits of external assistance have not been realized, and instances of aid ineffectiveness appear 
to be as numerous as instances of aid effectiveness. 
3
 
 
Many of the failures are an outcome of varied and sometimes conflicting circumstances. Often, 
the flow of aid has been too small and erratic to have any significant impact. Paradoxically, the 
flow of aid has sometimes been too large in relation to domestic capacities and has been rendered 
ineffective. Countries have often been circumscribed by their absorptive capacities, whose roots 
can be either endogenous or exogenous, that is, they can be due to a lack of domestic capacities 
to handle large amounts of aid or to the maddening array of cumbersome reporting requirements 
imposed by different donors that paralyze the government. If the flow of aid is substantial, it can 
also fail because of the emergence of Dutch disease, that is, the flow of aid may cause the real 
exchange rate to appreciate and thereby impede the growth of exports. Similarly, aid can fail 
because it obviates the need for hard choices and genuine reforms, and thus leads to the 
                                                 
3
 The term ―aid effectiveness‖ is largely self –explanatory. It refers to the effectiveness of foreign assistance in 
promoting economic development. However, as the perspective on development has evolved over the years, so has 
the meaning of aid effectiveness—the goals that the international community seeks to achieve through foreign 
assistance.  The goals have varied over the years—from increasing savings and investment to raising economic 
growth and per capita income to reducing poverty in its multi-dimensions.  In recent years, the international 
development agencies have come to equate aid effectiveness with attaining the MDG goals. 
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persistence of bad policies, poor governance, and endemic corruption, which keep countries 
locked in a state of economic stagnation and extreme poverty. Finally, foreign aid can fail if the 
cookie cutter approach of donor agencies results in the imposition of inappropriate policies and 
institutions that are out of step with the country‘s real requirements, and thereby immobilize 
and/or debilitate the economy.  
 
This paper provides a critical review of aid effectiveness in Bangladesh (for earlier accounts of 
foreign aid and its impact on economic development in Bangladesh see Islam 2003 and Sobhan 
1982). It focuses on the contributions of three major, high-profile donors: the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Government of Japan (GOJ). In assessing aid 
effectiveness, the paper uses a qualitative triangulation approach based on the subjective 
judgments of donors and recipients. This approach is dictated by the deficiencies of quantitative 
methods for this purpose and the lack of adequate and reliable quantitative data. Those familiar 
with recent aid effectiveness literature are aware that the regression-based cross-country 
literature has created more confusion than conclusions and produced few robust empirical results 
(Quibria and Murshid 2007; Rajan and Subramanian 2005a; Roodman 2007).  
 
The next section of this paper discusses the importance of foreign aid to Bangladesh as it has 
evolved over time. This is followed by a critical assessment of the economic and social impact of 
aid based on both donors‘ and the recipient‘s perspectives. The paper then discusses the causes 
of aid ineffectiveness. As this theme has a wider resonance beyond Bangladesh, the discussion 
next turns to the experiences of the developing world as a whole. Recommendations for making 
aid more effective follow, and the paper ends with some concluding remarks.  
 
THE ARITHMETIC OF AID FLOWS  
 
Bangladesh has received a sizable amount of foreign assistance over the years, with the annual 
flow of aid has ranged from about US$1.0 billion to some US$1.5 billion. Even though official 
development assistance is still a significant source of foreign exchange, its importance has 
declined over the years as other sources of foreign exchange, such as exports and workers‘ 
remittances, have picked up (Figure 1). In addition, as the economy has grown, the flow of aid as 
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a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) or a percentage of investment has declined over 
time. In the 1970s through the early 1990s, the net flow of aid as a percentage of GDP was more 
than 6 percent, but this declined to about 2 percent in 2005 (Figure 2). In the 1970s, soon after 
independence, external resources financed more than 70 percent of the country‘s investment, but 
this had fallen to less than 10 percent in 2005 (World Bank 2007b). This reflects the 
government‘s relative success at domestic resource mobilization and the increasing vigor of the 
private sector. Note also that in recent years Bangladesh has received less foreign aid as a 
percentage of GDP than either heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPCs) or other low-income 
countries (LICs) (Figure 3 and Figure 4), including others in Asia with the notable exception of 
India, which given its recent vigorous economic growth and new-found confidence in its own 
economic capabilities has decided to drastically reduce its dependence on foreign aid.  
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Development Indicators (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Official Development Assistance, FDI, Exports 
and Workers’ Remittances (In million $) 
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         Source: IMF (2007) 
 
 
    
Figure 2. Net Official Development Assistance to 
Bangladesh (% of GDP) 
Figure 3. Net ODA: Bangladesh, HIPCs and LICs (% of GDP) 
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             Source: IMF (2007) 
 
 
 
      
          
    Source: IMF (2007) 
 
Given the growth in agricultural productivity, the role of food aid has become virtually 
nonexistent as the economy has become more self-sufficient in food
4
, a dramatic contrast from 
the period immediately after independence, when food aid played a significant role (see Table 1). 
However, because of the sizable pipeline from earlier commitments by donors, disbursements 
continue to flow even in the absence of new commitments. With regard to commodity aid, both 
commitments and disbursements have remained close to zero with no buildup of the pipeline. 
Finally, in keeping with the general trend in international development assistance, policy 
lending—both at the macroeconomic and at the sectoral level—has become an important, 
                                                 
4
 Currently, in 2008, Bangladesh is faced with a shortage of food supply due a number of adverse economic shocks, 
leading to a substantial food import. However, there are reasons to believe that this is more a short-term blip than a 
long-term trend. 
Figure 4. Net ODA: Bangladesh and Asian LICs (% of GDP) 
Figure 4. Net ODA: Bangladesh and Asian LICs (% of GDP) 
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established part of the assistance program  , and in some cases has supplanted simple project 
lending. This development has been accompanied by increasing economic and sector work—so-
called knowledge products—by the multilateral financial institutions. Nevertheless, despite the 
apparent increase in policy lending, data on policy lending are not readily available and the 
government is maintaining its old classification system that lumps both project and policy 
lending together under ―project aid.‖ 
 
Paradoxically, while aid related to investment and economic development has waned, its 
significance as a catalyst for policy change has strengthened. In recent years, aid has accounted 
for less than 10 percent of gross investment and finances a smaller proportion of total import 
bills than in the past (Figure 5), yet the influence of donors in policy matters continues unabated, 
and indeed, has increased significantly. The locus of activism of donor agencies seems to have 
broadened to encompass almost all aspects of the economy and of society, from formulating 
technical economic policies to providing advice on broader societal issues, from guiding the 
functioning of democracy to holding dialogues between political adversaries. In recent years, 
donor representatives have not only become ubiquitous, but also seemingly omniscient, lavishly 
dishing out wisdom on virtually everything, above and beyond their specific areas of economic 
assistance! 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Foreign Aid as a Percentage of Government 
Expenditures, Per Capita Income, Imports and Investment 
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Source: Data from World Development Indicators (2007) 
 
The multilateral international financial institutions are the principal source of aid for Bangladesh 
(see Table 2), although the role of bilateral sources such the governments of Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada is also significant.
5
 Bilateral sources were almost as important as the 
multilaterals through the early 1990s, but now account for half of what the multilaterals provide. 
Many believe that multilateral aid is more economically oriented and less political than bilateral 
aid ; however, this argument does not seem to stand up to scrutiny, given that the ownership 
structure of the multilateral financial institutions remains concentrated and a good deal of 
consensus is apparent among the major donors. The two main sources of multilateral aid for 
Bangladesh are the World Bank and ADB, which have provided assistance largely, though not 
exclusively, from their concessional windows. However, the terms and conditions of the 
International Development Association and the Asian Development Fund have somewhat  
hardened, and in addition, ADB is  now classifying Bangladesh as a blend country—a country 
that borrows from both concessionary and nonconcessionary sources—which has contributed to 
the dilution  the grant element of the foreign assistance it receives.  
 
Finally, as most of the foreign assistance the country receives is concessional, the buildup of debt 
has been slow. The total external debt of the public sector is less than US$20 billion, equivalent 
to about 32 percent of GDP and some 130 percent of export earnings. Compared with other 
developing countries, Bangladesh‘s external debt is not exceptionally high and has stayed within 
prudential limits. 
                                                 
5
 The role of the US as a source of bilateral aid has declined significantly over the years, making it a marginal 
contributor to the country‘s development process. In addition, much of the US assistance is channeled through non-
governmental organizations that are often pre-selected, a fact that tends to undermine the  quality of its  foreign aid. 
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          Source: IMF (2007) 
 
Table 1. External Aid Commitments and Disbursements, 1999/00-2005/06 
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       Source: IMF (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. External Aid Disbursements by Donors, 1999/00-2005/06 
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF AID 
 
Since independence, Bangladesh has made significant economic strides despite its still low levels 
of per capita income. Its economic performance compares favorably with that of other 
developing countries; indeed, it is one of the most rapidly growing low-income countries in the 
world. As noted earlier, it has attained virtual self-sufficiency in food (except in times of natural 
disasters). Rising incomes and increasing food availability have helped reduce poverty 
significantly, although the extent of poverty remains substantial.
6
 Bangladesh has shown 
significant improvements in key social indicators such as fertility, life expectancy, school 
enrollment for girls, and child immunization (Table 3) and has successfully eradicated polio, 
which still infects some neighboring countries. It has already achieved one MDG—gender parity 
in primary and secondary education—and is on track to meeting several others, including halving 
poverty.  
 
Table 3 . Social Changes over Time 
 
  Indicators Before Now 
Secondary school enrollment 19 (1990) 43 (2005) 
Primary school enrollment 71 (1990) 93 (2004) 
Fertility rate 6.1 (1972) 3.0 (2005) 
Immunization , DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) 1 (1980) 88 (2005) 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 
months) 
1 (1982) 81 (2005) 
Improved sanitation facilities ( % of population with 
access) 
20 (1990) 39 (2004) 
Life expectancy at birth  45 (1972) 64 (2005) 
Malnutrition prevalence , weight for age (% percentage of 
children under 5) 
68 (1983) 48 (2004) 
Malnutrition rate (children under 5 per thousand) 239 (1970) 73 (2005) 
Mortality rate (per one thousand live births) 145 (1970) 54 (2005) 
 
   Source: World Bank (2007) 
 
                                                 
6
 According to the latest available figures (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2007a), the incidence of poverty declined 
by 9 percentage points between   2000 to 2005.  If the higher (national) poverty line is used, the incidence of poverty 
declined   from about 49 to 40 percent of the population; if the lower poverty line is used, it declined from about 34 
to 25 percent of the population during the same period.  However, as it is the case with many other developing 
countries, these figures are fraught with controversy, though few would disagree with the direction of this change.  
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While some of the achievements in social and economic indicators can be attributed to the 
positive contributions of aid, establishing a quantitative causal relationship between aid and 
economic development in a rigorous manner is difficult. As the cross-country empirical literature 
on aid effectiveness suggests, attempts to establish such a relationship have proved to be highly 
elusive. Thus rather than following this well-beaten but indecisive track, this paper explores the 
issue of aid effectiveness in Bangladesh essentially based on qualitative evidence.  
 
Donors’ Evaluations 
 
Donors now undertake ―independent‖ reviews of their programs through their in-house 
evaluation departments with some regularity. These reviews—which are essentially subjective 
and based on a set of predetermined broad criteria such as relevance, efficiency, efficacy , impact 
etc-- are important, as they provide the donors‘ with evaluations of their own programs and 
performance. This review looks at three major donors to Bangladesh.
7
 
 
The World Bank  
 
The World Bank is the coordinator of aid donors to Bangladesh. It is also the largest lender to 
Bangladesh (with a cumulative lending of around $12.5 billion in 2007), as well as the most 
influential, since its independence. It has helped shape the country‘s institutions and policies 
more than any other agency. For these reasons, the role of the World Bank is singularly 
important in any discussion of aid effectiveness in Bangladesh.  
 
In the 1970s, during the initial phase of its operations, the World Bank concentrated largely on 
project lending with a focus on four objectives: achieving food self-sufficiency, mobilizing 
domestic resources, improving social indicators, and enhancing project implementation. Even 
                                                 
7
 The International Monetary Fund was excluded from this review because its direct contribution to economic 
development and poverty reduction is marginal. This is because its mandate limits its activities to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, a role that is important, but does not have a direct and immediate bearing on economic 
development. 
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though over time the country attained varying degrees of success in all these areas, the pace of 
progress was slow in the 1970s.  
 
During the next phase of its operations in the late 1980s, the World Bank focused on policy 
reforms to create an environment conducive to private sector development. These reforms were 
addressed at removing the distortions in trade, pricing, credit allocation, and interest rates. Once 
again, the efforts yielded mixed success and no dramatic results. In its evaluation report, the 
World Bank attributed these mixed results not to any deficiencies in its own program, but to the 
government‘s failure to implement reforms. Indeed, the World Bank went so far as to argue that 
―a core constraint in the development process in Bangladesh was the government itself and its 
unwillingness to enforce the needed public sector reforms‖ (World Bank 1998b, p. 56).  
 
To address the governance issues, the World Bank imposed more stringent policy conditions in 
the 1990s, but yet again, according to the World Bank, the government did not fully implement 
these reforms. The Bank went on to interpret this as follows: ―Government, both at local and 
national levels, has yet to define a proper enabling environment that reduces transaction costs 
and allows entrepreneurship to flourish‖ (World Bank 1998b, p. 53). Part of the vacillation on 
the part of the government may have had to do with political economy constraints, but part was 
due to the intellectual basis of the reforms, about which there was always a general degree of 
skepticism not only in Bangladesh, but also elsewhere.  
 
The World Bank‘s evaluation assessment about policy reform in Bangladesh was both 
disingenuous and self-serving. It was disingenuous in the sense that changing policies or 
institutions is a gradual process, as it is evident in all countries, including the advanced countries. 
It was self-serving because the World Bank heaped all the blame on the government, but part of 
the responsibility must lie with the World Bank for proceeding without a thorough analysis of 
Bangladesh‘s political economy constraints and for imposing conditionalities that were 
unrealistic and beyond the government‘s capacity to deliver.  
 
The late 1980s and the 1990s were a time when the international organizations as a whole pushed 
policy lending to bring about policy change. Much of this lending involved excessive 
 15 
conditionalities (policy changes attached to policy lending) that were beyond the implementation 
capacity of recipient countries; was based on the cookie cutter approach of the Washington 
consensus, that is, on privatization, liberalization, and stabilization with insufficient analysis; and 
imposed policy conditionalities with the ―agreement‖ of the bureaucracy, but the exclusion of 
society as a whole, and even of parliaments. The consequence has been inappropriate policies, 
undermining of democratic processes, and poor economic outcomes.  
 
Notwithstanding all these problems, the World Bank considers its assistance program to 
Bangladesh ―effective‖ even though the evaluation statistics point to a mixed outcome. 
According to the most recent publicly available country evaluation report (World Bank 1998b), 
the percentage of Bank projects that were deemed unsatisfactory was higher than Operations 
Evaluation Department averages Bank-wide. With regard to sustainability, the performance of 
projects in Bangladesh was unfavorable, as many had negligible institutional impacts. The report 
also noted that lending to Bangladesh was inefficient: loans were more time-consuming and 
compared unfavorably with the Bank-wide average. This poor project implementation 
performance no doubt reflected the country‘s capacity constraints, but at the same time, this was 
not entirely a domestic problem, but stemmed from the multiplicity of donors with diverse 
reporting and accounting requirements that made heavy demands on scarce domestic managerial 
capacity.
8
  
 
The Asian Development Bank  
 
In many ways, the findings from ADB‘s evaluation of its country assistance program ( with a 
cumulative lending of $8-plus billion in 2006) are similar to those of the World Bank. Like the 
World Bank, ADB (2003) considers its program to be relevant and successful in a number of 
areas. These areas include support to agriculture to achieve the objective of self-sufficiency in 
food. Similarly, ADB considers its assistance in the energy and transport sectors to have been 
beneficial and to have ―made an important contribution to facilitating the acceleration of gross 
                                                 
8 International aid agencies have recently recognized that part of the implementation problem stems from donors‘ 
diverse procedures and standards and are working toward harmonizing these procedures and standards. aligning 
them with countries‘ own systems. To date, however, other than a number of ―high-level‖ meetings and 
communiqués, few concrete results have materialized. 
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domestic product growth in the late 1990s‖ (ADB 2003, p. iv). However, it considers its 
initiatives in the late 1990s in the areas of agriculture, forestry, and the social sectors, particularly 
health and education, to have had little impact on poverty. Interestingly, ADB does not attribute 
this lack of success to the general slowdown in poverty reduction Bangladesh experienced in the 
1990s (due to shifts in income distribution), but to the lack of alignment with the so-called 
Partnership Agreement on Poverty Reduction.
9
 
  
Like the World Bank, ADB berates the government for its failure to implement reforms to foster 
development, which according to ADB accounts for its general failure in relation to policy 
lending. ADB, however, traces this failure to vested interests and goes on to emphasize ―the 
importance of identifying vested interests opposed to policy reform,‖ without however, 
specifying what to do about them. It also had second thoughts about policy lending for capital 
markets and railways, because these are two areas that play ―a relatively limited role in the 
economy, governance issues are entrenched, and commitment to reforms has been lacking.‖ 
ADB also suggests reducing its involvement in sectors where ―sector performance has been poor, 
the potential for catalyzing impact is limited and ADB has no comparative advantage‖ (ADB 
2003, p. v). Other than being an explicit admission of failure, this suggests limiting assistance to 
sectors where success has been limited. If this strategy is followed, this would imply drastically 
limiting ADB operations in Bangladesh. In particular, this may mean that ADB would shy away 
from areas involving policy reform and analysis.  
 
The Government of Japan  
                                                 
9
 The Partnership Agreement on Poverty Reduction is the pretentious initiative that ADB took, somewhat akin to the 
World Bank‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, but that it had to discard because of pressure by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. As of 2000, to receive development assistance, low-income countries (with the 
exception of India) are required to prepare national poverty reduction strategies. The governments, in collaboration 
with World Bank and International Monetary Fund staff, are supposed to prepare these national strategy documents, 
known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The papers describe countries‘ macroeconomic, structural, and social 
policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, along with their associated external financing needs. 
According to the World Bank, these papers are guided by five core principle, namely, they should be (a) country 
driven, involving broadly based participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational steps; (b) 
results oriented, focusing on outcomes that benefit the poor; (c) comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional 
nature of poverty; (d) partnership oriented, involving coordinated participation by development partners (bilateral, 
multilateral, and nongovernmental); and (v) based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction. For details see 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2005). 
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Japan is the largest bilateral donor to Bangladesh and accounts for a sizable portion of the 
country‘s foreign assistance. GOJ implements its development assistance program through a 
combination of governmental agencies—the embassy, JICA, Japan Bank for International 
Agencies and Japan External Trade Organization—and the stated objectives of its country 
assistance program are economic growth, social development with human security (including 
health, education, gender equity and environmental protection) and governance.   However, in 
reality, Japan has focused on physical infrastructure more than any other donor and has taken a 
lead role in funding a number of high-profile bridges such as the Jamuna, Paksey, Rupsa and 
Padma bridges.    
 
The recent country evaluation by JICA (2004) found that its program was more or less consistent 
with country priorities as expressed in the Five-Year Plan and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP), though JICA had little involvement in gender and governance issues. It noted 
certain deficiencies in program formulation, coordination, and implementation from the Japanese 
side. 
 
Even though JICA has been investing in agriculture and agricultural productivity has been on the 
rise, the country evaluation concludes both modestly and wisely that it is hard to see how Japan‘s 
assistance contributed to macro indicators. JICA also made significant loans for rural 
infrastructure and social sectors. Overall, JICA (2004) concludes that the impact of Japanese 
assistance on macroeconomic indicators was difficult to observe, both because of the short 
gestation period (with respect to the evaluation) and because of the relatively small amount of 
aid in relation to total investment in the economy, though some results were perceptible in the 
health sector. However, JICA hopes that Japanese aid will be more effective and have a greater 
impact on the economy in the future, as its assistance for the construction and maintenance of 
major bridges and it technical cooperation in the fields of power and infrastructure development 
begin to bear fruit.  
 
Summing Up 
Thus from donors‘ perspective, aid effectiveness has been mixed in Bangladesh. Donors consider 
their investment projects to have been more successful than their policy loans. The failure of 
 18 
policy reforms, that is, the country‘s failure to implement prescribed policy reforms, is, however, 
not unique to Bangladesh but is common across the developing world. Indeed, the successful 
Asian countries, including the East Asian newly industrialized countries and such high-
performing countries like China and India had exerted a high degree of autonomy from the 
international agencies when formulating their economic policies. 
 
The Recipients   
 
In 2006, the Center for Policy Dialogue organized a policy seminar on aid that was attended by 
senior civil servants, economists, selected members of the media, and business leaders, or, in 
short, it reflected the ―voices‖ of society‘s elites. The dialogue highlighted their views on aid and 
why it has achieved such mixed results. Participants‘ comments, which are reproduced verbatim, 
included the following (Center for Policy Dialogue 2005): 
(i) Donors’ influence is disproportionate: The significance of aid in influencing the policy 
agenda seems singularly disproportionate to the declining significance of aid in the country‘s 
macroeconomics. 
(ii) Conditionality is limiting the degree of policy autonomy: Multilateral aid is not always 
unrelated to political variables and is usually associated with a wider variety of 
conditionalities that restrict policy autonomy.  
(iii)A disconnect is apparent between the benefits and costs of adjustment: Resources accrue to 
the government because of adjustment credit, but reforms relate to the sectors, and as the 
sectors do not get the money, they do not have any incentive to implement the reforms. 
(Mashiur Rahman, p. 10) 
(iv) Home- grown reforms and vetting by parliament are needed: The government should form 
committees in ministries or independent commissions to formulate reforms that could later be 
discussed and vetted by parliament.  
(v) Donors have little impact on poverty reduction: The donors have done little in relation to 
poverty alleviation. Except for Food-for-Works, all programs were home-grown and the 
donors helped only in not cutting down social expenditures under adjustment programs.  
(vi) More aid to higher education should be provided: More grants and sectoral programs in 
higher education are needed.  
 19 
(vii) Reforms are not owned because they are imposed: Bangladesh needs aid for development 
and revenue support. As a result, when donors propose any aid with conditionalities, the 
government does not have the courage to say no. This is the reason Bangladesh does not own 
any reforms.  
(viii) The PRSP is a poor substitute for planning. It is an inadequate substitute for the overall 
planning of the economy. The PRSP remains a wish list.  
(ix) Donor policies are inappropriate: Some donor policies are very good, but their 
implementation is extremely difficult because they are not easily acceptable by society.   
(x) The Washington-consensus has yielded few benefits for Bangladesh: Policy and prescription 
of undiluted privatization rather than development of the private sector, sudden liberalization 
rather than gradual adjustment, and deregulation rather than regulatory redesign have not 
resulted in any major breakthrough in economic growth, poverty alleviation, and equity. 
 
The foregoing comments suggest that aid has been less than effective and has had little direct 
impact on poverty reduction; that it has led to a plethora of inappropriate policies imposed 
exogenously by donors who have exerted a disproportionate influence on policies that were 
neither owned by the country nor went through the usual democratic vetting mechanism; and 
above all, that the PRSP exercise, which was artificially imposed by donors, has few indigenous 
roots and has helped undermine the traditional planning mechanism.
10
 
 
AID EFFECTIVENESS ISSUES 
 
The foregoing discussion highlights a number of issues that seem to have constrained the 
effectiveness of foreign assistance in Bangladesh. However, these issues are not in any sense 
unique to Bangladesh, but have a wider relevance. In light of the generic nature of these issues, 
the following posits the discussion within a general framework that can draw on, and be 
informed by, broader international experience.  
 
                                                 
10
 India refused to go along with this process and asked the World Bank to anchor its assistance program to the 
country‘s Five-Year Plan.  In the case of Bangladesh, the PRSP has virtually replaced the Five Year Plan which has 
become practically   defunct.  In the absence of such a plan, the medium-term budgetary framework reported in the 
budget  has become    ―a summary reflection of CAS (country assistance strategy of the World Bank) containing just 
enough to meet the enquiry of IMF and WB.‖ (Rahman 2008, p14). 
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Absorptive Capacity Constraints 
 
It is almost an article of faith among development economists that developing countries suffer 
from absorptive capacity constraints, that is, they are limited in terms of the amount of foreign 
assistance they can productively utilize. It is also widely believed—for a review of this literature, 
see Quibria and Murshid 2007— that there are diminishing returns to aid; that is, as developing 
countries have low levels of human capital and limited physical infrastructure, the returns from 
foreign assistance decline as the flow of aid increases (this idea originally dates back to Chenery 
and Strout 1966; Millikan and Rostow 1957; and Rosenstein-Rodan 1961). Annual portfolio 
performance reviews carried out by donor agencies often highlight these absorptive capacity 
constraints, which are reflected in delays in implementing programs and in achieving sufficient 
development impact. As noted earlier, donors have documented numerous issues in relation to 
the implementation of projects and programs in Bangladesh in their country evaluation reports 
and annual portfolio reviews. Even though these issues reflect the country‘s human resource and 
bureaucratic constraints to a great extent, attributing all the problems to the recipient country is 
unfair.
11
 Many of the problems also stem from the cumbersome policies, procedures, and 
practices of donor agencies, each of which have copious reporting demands and insist on their 
particular ways of doing things. (For an interesting account of the bureaucratic rigmarole 
surrounding the delivery of foreign assistance, see Easterly 2003a.) 
 
Real Exchange Rate Appreciation 
 
Whether through binding capacity constraints or diminishing competitiveness, the effectiveness 
of aid can decline as its volume increases, suggesting a nonlinear relationship between aid and 
growth. Even if one accepts that the impact of aid is subject to diminishing returns, the 
possibility is moot for most aid-recipient countries, as the point at which aid starts to have a 
                                                 
11
 Some of the institutional mechanisms donors have introduced to circumvent the absorptive capacity issues have 
their own drawbacks. One such institutional mechanism is the project implementation unit, coordination, 
management, and implementation entity for aid-financed projects intended to fast-track the implementation process. 
While the unit may circumvent some of the implementation issues, it also creates its own set of problems, such as 
vested interests and competing incentives, and results in thwarted local institutional development.  
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negative effect on growth is much higher than the levels of official development assistance 
currently available to most low-income countries.
12
 
 
According to Rajan and Subramanian (2005b), the key to understanding weak associations 
between aid and growth is the real exchange rate overvaluation associated with any large 
windfall, that is, the so called Dutch disease.
13
 The mechanism through which Dutch disease 
operates is straightforward. An inflow of foreign aid leads to an increase in expenditures on 
nontraded goods. This increases the prices of goods and services produced in the nontraded 
sectors as well as the prices of domestic inputs that are used to produce them. This erodes the 
competitiveness of those export sectors that also depend on those nontraded inputs. 
 
Why the mechanisms leading to real overvaluations should operate so strongly within developing 
countries is not clear. These countries typically produce far below capacity, while the symptoms 
of Dutch disease arise when countries producing close to their production possibilities frontiers 
are unable to respond quickly to sudden increases in demand (McKinley 2005). An increase in 
expenditures following an inflow of foreign aid may therefore have limited price effects in 
developing countries, which are usually characterized by high unemployment and idle capacity. 
Moreover, if foreign assistance is directed toward improving the economy‘s productive capacity 
through investments in infrastructure, education, institutions, and health, this productivity 
increase could potentially offset any loss of competitiveness resulting from Dutch disease (Adam 
and Bevan 2006). However, a shortage of human capital and public infrastructure can cause 
severe bottlenecks in many developing countries, limiting their ability to absorb large amounts of 
aid. Real exchange rate overvaluation and an erosion of export competitiveness—the factors that 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) argue are responsible for aid ineffectiveness—may therefore 
simply reflect the capacity constraints in developing countries. In such circumstances, rather than 
                                                 
12
 The total flow of aid to low-income countries (those whose annual per capita income is less than US$825) was 
US$34 billion (in current dollars) in 2004, compared with $44 billion in total workers‘ remittances that same year. 
This flow of aid translates to less than US$15 per capita and about 2.8 percent of the aggregate gross national 
income of low income countries (World Bank 2006). 
13
 In recent years, a number of authors, including Adenauer and Vagassky (1998), Nyoni (1998), Vos (1998), Vos 
and Johansson (1994), and White and Wignaraja (1992), have analyzed the Dutch disease effects of aid inflows. 
However, these studies differ significantly in their conclusions regarding the impact of aid on real exchange rate 
overvaluations and the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors. 
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aggravating the problem of Dutch disease, a larger inflow of aid can help alleviate these 
constraints and become an important part of the solution strategy. 
 
In the case of Bangladesh, there is no evidence to suggest that foreign aid has led to a serious 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate and an erosion of export competitiveness. Indeed, 
compared with its neighboring countries, Bangladesh‘s real exchange rate has become 
increasingly more competitive over time (Figure 4). Thus the apprehension that aid may cause 
Dutch disease and an overvaluation of the real exchange rate is unwarranted. What has really 
hampered the growth of exports has not been exchange rate factors, but the various supply 
constraints arising from physical infrastructure bottlenecks and skills shortages. 
 
 
                            Source: IMF 2006. 
Governance and Corruption 
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2007) suggest that foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth 
through its adverse impact on governance. They argue that manufacturing is highly dependent on 
the quality of governance, and that as the volume of aid increases, it reduces the government‘s 
Figure 6. Real Effective Exchange Rates in 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
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accountability. In particular, the government slackens its efforts to maintain the rule of law, 
ensure predictable judicial outcomes and contract enforcement, and limit corruption.
14
  
 
As far as Bangladesh is concerned, Transparency International has ranked it as the most corrupt 
of countries for five consecutive years. Given that the Transparency International index is largely 
subjective, whether such a precise ordering of countries is meaningful is questionable. 
Nevertheless governance, in particular corruption, is clearly a serious concern for Bangladesh. 
Even though the current government may have arrested Bangladesh‘s further downward slide 
into corruption, the extent and magnitude of corruption remains significant, and foreign aid may 
have been an important conduit of corruption. To the extent that foreign aid has indeed been a 
source of corruption, the culpability lies with both recipients and donors, as the aid delivery 
process—including procuring materials and awarding contracts and consultancies—is under the 
dual control of both donors and recipients. In an article that draws on Bangladesh‘s experience, 
Rashid (2004) argues that foreign aid makes domestic institutions porous and amenable to 
outside influences, thereby making them incapable of administering the laws and rules that are 
the reason they exist in the first place.  
 
According to World Bank indicators, the overall quality of governance in Bangladesh has shown 
little or no improvement over time—indeed, some indicators have experienced some worsening 
(Figure 5). However, this apparent deterioration has had little impact on either economic growth 
or poverty reduction. This lack of correlation between governance and growth, which the World 
Bank (2007a) has labeled the Bangladesh conundrum, is not unique to Bangladesh, but is equally 
applicable to a number of high-performing economies, such as China, India, and Vietnam.
15
  
 
 
                                                 
14
 One can also conceive of an opposite scenario, namely, foreign aid provides a country with the wherewithal to pay 
greater attention to governance issues, as many dimensions of good governance entail greater investments of 
resources in physical and social infrastructure. This may be the basis of the simple correlation between governance 
indicators and per capita income.  
15
 The relationship between governance and economic development is a complex one , which  cannot be codified 
into a simple formula. See Dixit (2007) and Quibria (2006) for discussions of some of the underlying issues that can 
skew the relationship between governance and development and obfuscate the case for reform.  
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 Source:  World Bank (2007a) 
 
Conditionality and Ownership  
 
A common complaint among donors is that policy conditionality has not worked in 
Bangladesh.
16
 However, this is not unique to Bangladesh. Indeed, the World Bank‘s (1998a) 
celebrated report Assessing Aid notes this lack of a connection between aid and policies in a 
wider context. The report notes the existence of ―surprisingly little relationship between the 
amount of aid and policies‖ (p. 47) and of ―a mountain of literature [that is skeptical] about the 
ability of conditionality to promote reform in countries where there is no strong local movement 
in that direction‖ (p. 51) In short, a sizable body of literature suggests that policy conditionality 
does not work.  
                                                 
16
 Conditionality in the traditional sense refers to policy conditionality. In recent years, however, the emphasis has 
shifted from policy conditionality to process conditionality that links lending to changes in the design and delivery 
of aid . The putative purpose of process conditionality is to minimize corruption, foster respect for human rights, and 
engender greater accountability of the government to its citizens.
 
Process conditionality, which seeks to involve 
participation by local stakeholders in discussions of programs and policies, is not, however, without its flaws. It 
requires donors to make intrusive and difficult judgments about the quality of openness and the democratic nature of 
recipient countries, factors that are hard to assess and even more difficult to measure. In addition, process 
conditionality may undermine indigenous institutions of accountability, such as local government and civil society 
organizations, and overemphasize internationally visible nongovernmental organizations.  
Figure 7. Governance Indicators 1998 and 2004 
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Policy conditionality is ineffective for many reasons.
17
 First, the donor and the recipient often 
have different views about the program. This divergence may not necessarily relate to primary 
issues, such as the program‘s content, but to secondary matters, such as the best means for 
achieving the program, the sequencing of actions, or the timeframe. Second, perhaps the most 
fundamental problem with policy conditionality is its dynamic time inconsistency problem. The 
recipient government may agree to a reform program prior to receiving aid, but it may renege on 
its promise as incentives change following the disbursement of aid. In other words, the issue of 
conditionality goes beyond designing an incentive-compatible contract in a static principal-agent 
framework. The interactions between donor and recipient are both dynamic and asymmetric, 
elements that make the relationship inherently more complex than standard static principal-agent 
problems. Third, other influences on the donor side tend to adversely affect the final attainment 
of conditionality. These relate to the incentive structure of donor agencies and the so-called 
Samaritan‘s dilemma. Existing incentive systems in donor agencies place a high value on aid 
disbursement, which encourages aid officials to maximize aid disbursements even if this means 
overlooking the failure of conditionality. Such failures may also arise from compassion and the 
desire to help the poor in aid-recipient countries. However, while the poor may benefit from 
policy conditions in the long run, a trade-off often exists between relatively small short-term 
gains versus potentially larger long-term benefits. This can lead aid agencies to overlook the lack 
of fulfillment of policy actions in poor countries (Kanbur 2006).  
 
The ineffectiveness of policy conditionality has elicited two different types of reactions. The first 
type—associated with Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1995), among others—has been to argue that 
conditionality works in theory, but that its application has been flawed in practice. According to 
this view, conditionality should be simpler, deviations from committed reform programs should 
be punished consistently, and a critical element for effective reform is country ownership. 
                                                 
17
 The reasons may differ from country to country. Rahman (2008) provides an interesting personal account, based 
on his own experience as the top civil servant coordinating foreign aid resources of the country.  He notes that while   
Bangladesh government officials collaborated with donors  in the design of  programs and  reform agenda in such 
diverse sectors as jute, energy, railways, industries, telecommunication, health and education, the role and 
participation  varied significantly  across sectors. He also notes that though  donors and recipients  always agreed on 
the desirability reforms at the general level, they often tended to diverge significantly on  specifics— but at the end 
the donors prevailed. He concludes that while government participation enhances the probability of — but does 
guarantee— success of a policy reform agenda.  
 26 
Country ownership has been defined in different ways,
18
 but it generally refers to a country‘s 
commitment to pursue reforms independently of incentives provided by donors. However, the 
meaning of country commitment has varied from broad definitions to narrow definitions. 
Sometimes it is broadly interpreted to mean commitment by the entire recipient society— 
including the government, civil society, and the private sector—while at other times it may be 
narrowly defined to mean commitment only on the part of the government. Given the various 
senses in which the term country ownership is used, many, for example, Buiter (2004), find it to 
be an unhelpful and misleading concept whose time has passed. Nevertheless, despite the 
amorphousness of the concept, donor agencies have continued to stress the importance of 
country ownership, while at the same time they often tend to undermine ownership by 
maintaining various types of control over the design and implementation of reform programs.
19
 
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international donor agencies now 
build their respective aid programs for poorer countries around the PRSPs, an attempt to confer 
greater ownership to recipient countries.
20
 
 
The second type of reaction is to accept that traditional policy conditionality does not work and 
therefore needs to be abandoned. This point of view suggests a different type of conditionality 
that is tantamount to selectivity,
21
 that is, aid should be given to countries on the basis of ex post 
policies. This approach abandons the imposition of ex ante conditionality and argues that 
                                                 
18 
The World Bank‘s Operations Evaluation Department has set four key criteria for country ownership: (a) the locus 
of initiative must be in the government, (b) the key policy makers must be intellectually convinced, (c) the top 
political leadership must provide evidence of public support, and (d) the existence of broadly-based stakeholder 
participation must be apparent. Fostering country ownership therefore entails extensive government consultations 
with other segments of society, including civil society and the private sector. The putative purpose of such 
consultation is to elicit new ideas, knowledge, and opinions and to promote consensus on the strategy. As this 
definition involves large elements of subjectivity, any assessment of ownership remains largely subjective. 
19 
Stiglitz (1999) suggests that the role of donors in the design and implementation of reforms should be drastically 
limited to that of economic advisers who make countries aware of prevailing views. 
20 
However, this attempt to bestow greater ownership has at best achieved only limited success. First, PRSPs 
continue to be mostly donor rather than country driven, particularly where domestic capacity to formulate such a 
strategy is lacking (Easterly 2006b). Second, even where such capacity exists, the PRSP process often turns into 
what Van de Walle (2005) calls an act of ventriloquism— that is, when recipient countries present their PRSPs, they 
present precisely those programs and strategies that the donors favor in order to receive funds. Finally, as the PRSP 
process is a great strain on scarce resources, it should be abandoned in favor of the five-year plans that most 
countries prepare on their own.  
21
 In its traditional sense, a country receives aid on the basis of a promise to undertake a stipulated set of policy 
actions. In other words, conditionality entails a set of prior actions before the loan is disbursed, and is thus based on 
ex ante reform. Selectivity, by contrast, relates to ex post reform: aid is made available on the basis of the success of 
ex post reform. In practice, selectivity is combined with process conditionality. 
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selectivity will ensure a superior outcome. In a ―repeated game,‖ as long as the donor 
consistently rewards countries that demonstrate good policies with aid, it will elicit ―good‖ 
behavior from recipients. 
 
Gunning (2000) lists four frequent objections to selectivity. First, by definition, selectivity 
excludes countries with poor governance and unsound policies. This will exclude not only 
countries with malevolent leaders but also countries with enlightened leaders who are hamstrung 
not by a lack of will, but by a lack of institutional capacity to address governance issues (Barder 
and Birdsall 2006). Consequently, poor people living in those countries with weak governance 
who could potentially benefit from foreign assistance suffer. Second, countries with good 
policies can generate adequate domestic and foreign private investment without foreign 
assistance. Third, selectivity makes aid allocation contingent on the definition of good policies. 
While some aspects of good policy may be objectively defined, others involve subjective 
judgments resulting in little consensus on what constitutes good policies and results in 
bargaining between donors and recipients. Fourth, selectivity may conflict with ownership. This 
happens when donors attempt to provide detailed, multidimensional definitions of ―good‖ 
policies that are inconsistent with the recipient government‘s own development objectives.  
 
Gunning (2000) considers the first two objections unsustainable. With respect to the first 
objection, he argues that poor people in poor countries will not in any case benefit from foreign 
assistance when the quality of governance is questionable. One way to circumvent this problem 
is to bypass the government and assist the poor through other conduits, such as nongovernmental 
organizations. With respect to the second objection, Gunning argues that even if policies are 
good, poor countries do not metamorphose into developed countries overnight. In the interim 
period, when domestic savings and foreign private investment remain limited, foreign aid 
continues to play a key role in the transformation process.  
 
In sum, ex ante policy conditionality appears to be largely ineffective in practice; however, 
selectivity, which is now commonly used in conjunction with process conditionality, has also not 
proved to be as fruitful as originally anticipated. In view of this, to further enhance aid 
effectiveness, recipients need to be given greater real autonomy over the deployment of aid 
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resources and the formulation of policies. This has led some authors, for example, Kanbur 
Sandler, and Morrison (1999) and Ranis (2006), to suggest that aid from all agencies should be 
pooled and allocated as lump sum transfers, with recipient countries given full responsibility for 
allocating it across sectors and for implementing projects without donor interference. Similarly, 
Barder and Birdsall (2006) propose a hands-off approach to foreign aid, which they call 
payments for progress. Under this proposal, foreign aid would be offered to poorer countries 
based on evidence of progress, which would be measured in terms of outcomes, and not policies 
and other intermediate inputs. Barder and Birdsall argue that this would give local institutions 
flexibility and autonomy, as well as space for institutional experimentation, while at the same 
time ensuring that aid pays only for real and measurable progress. 
 
Measurement of Aid Effectiveness 
 
The choice of measure matters for aid effectiveness. Under current practice, the implicit metric 
the international community uses is some measure of recipient countries‘ policies and 
institutions. The World Bank, for example, allocates aid largely on the basis of its country policy 
and institutional assessment index, which consists of 16 components grouped into 4 categories: 
macroeconomic policies, structural policies, public sector management, and social inclusion (for 
more information on recent changes to this index see World Bank 2005). Similarly, the success 
of policy-based lending is measured by the extent to which countries‘ meet policy conditions. 
However, these are all indirect and convoluted ways of viewing aid effectiveness, which should 
instead be measured directly on the basis of economic outcomes. Indeed, many development 
practitioners have come to this conclusion in recent years and an intellectual shift in favor of 
outcome-based conditionality rather than policy-based conditionality is under way. Under 
outcome-based conditionality, donors focus on impacts and outcomes rather than on inputs, 
activities, and outputs.
22
 The European Commission has recently introduced a form of outcome-
                                                 
22
 Inputs refer to the financial, human, and material resources used for a development intervention, for example, the 
budget used to construct schools or health centers. Outputs refer to the products, goods, and services that result from 
a development intervention, for example, the number of schools built and the number of health centers opened. 
Outcomes refer to intermediate indicators of results, such as the number of students who graduate from the schools 
and the number of visitors to the health centers. Impact refers to the long-term consequences of the intervention, for 
instance, improvements in health and education indicators. Given the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between 
medium-term outcomes and long-term impacts, they are often lumped together under the heading of outcomes.  
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based conditionality for its adjustment aid to African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (Adam 
and others 2004).  
 
The main arguments advanced in favor of policy-based conditionality rather than outcome-based 
conditionality are that policy changes are easier to observe and monitor and have greater 
incentive effects. Policies are more directly controllable by governments than outcomes and their 
implementation can be monitored more easily. Outcomes are not under the full control of 
governments and reflect a variety of influences, including negative exogenous shocks. Moreover, 
a long time lag often occurs between policy decisions and outcomes in terms of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. This combination of time lags and weak links between policies 
and outcomes can further dilute incentives for governments to undertake positive policy actions.  
 
The main argument put forward for outcome-based conditionality is that it promotes greater 
ownership and accountability. Some observers, for example, Gunning (2000), argue that the 
current practice of donors undertaking detailed assessments of a country‘s entire policy 
environment is unnecessary and tends to undermine ownership. As donors should be more 
concerned with outcome indicators and not the means for attaining them, governments should be 
given free rein to choose their policies, which would help promote ownership of policies and 
strengthen accountability, thereby enhancing private sector confidence.  
 
The main argument against policy-based conditionality is that it is imperfect in the sense that it 
will not be able to achieve a first-best outcome. Drazen and Fischer (1997) identify three reasons 
for this. First, government policies are imperfectly observable. Second, results are not fully 
determined by policies but are also influenced by luck. Third, governments have varying degrees 
of competence that cannot readily be distinguished ex ante. In addition, a good deal of 
uncertainty—as well as lack of knowledge—surrounds the ―results chain‖ that tracks the 
causation of a development intervention from inputs and activities to outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts.  
 
At the same time, outcome-based conditionality is also fraught with practical difficulties. The 
indicators commonly suggested for outcome monitoring are GDP growth, changes in poverty, 
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and changes in child mortality, but unlike for growth rates, current data on poverty and mortality 
are not always readily available. In addition, as most outcome indicators are likely to change 
only gradually, any meaningful impact assessment can only be undertaken after a number of 
years, plus such assessments may reward or punish a current government for the actions of a 
previous government. 
 
In light of these difficulties, outcome-based conditionality that purports to monitor long-term 
impacts and medium-term outcome indicators may need to be selective and may have to be 
supplemented by output indicators and other indicators of intermediate results. Depending on the 
availability of data on different types of indicators, as well as the accuracy with which they can 
be monitored, the final choice may necessitate a mixture of output and intermediate result 
indicators, but not inputs. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Current aid practices are flawed in a number of respects and need to be amended to make foreign 
assistance more effective. Some recommendations to this end are as follows: 
 
First, as currently practiced, the bulk of effort in relation to aid effectiveness is anchored in a 
notion of ―good‖ institutions and policies that aid agencies strive to foster across the developing 
world. If aid agencies are interested in enhancing the effectiveness of aid, they should abandon 
this cookie cutter approach, recognize the diversity that exists among countries, and give 
countries the space to design their own policies and institutions (UNCTAD 2006).  
 
Second, currently donors allocate aid based on some notion of selectivity. However, such 
selectivity should be based on actual economic and social outcomes, that is, on concrete and 
measurable results, and not on subjective assessments of policies and institutions as is currently 
the predominant practice. 
 
Third, policy-based lending founded on ex ante policy conditionality has proved to be largely 
ineffective. One way to improve conditionality is to promote country ownership of strategies and 
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policies, a concept that has been formalized in the PRSP process imposed by the international 
donor agencies, but even though the emphasis on ownership is correct, it remains poorly defined 
and measured. When a country is genuinely in charge of its development process, it can not only 
better identify with its policies and strategies, but can also bring local knowledge to work. Thus 
some have suggested that recipient countries should be given complete autonomy in managing 
their aid resources without donor interference and on the basis of national plans. 
 
Fourth, under the new international development compact, the principal basis for allocating aid 
should be national plans and MDG assessments. These documents, which should be coherently 
linked to each other, would define a country‘s external finance requirements and development 
strategies. According to this perspective, a country‘s development performance would be 
measured in terms of its progress toward achieving the MDGs over a given time frame and 
further scaling up of assistance would be linked to this progress. When the data to monitor 
progress are not available, monitoring may be limited to a few strategic variables.  
 
Fifth, maximizing the impact of aid on poverty reduction requires identifying and eliminating the 
major constraints to poverty reduction in a particular country, and this is where donor agencies 
can play an important supporting role.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The mixed success of foreign aid in Bangladesh can be traced to shared failures on the part of 
both the government and donors. Donors‘ current approach to aid suffers from some generic 
problems. The foregoing analysis highlights some of the issues and suggests measures to address 
them. These measures, which are intended to (a) introduce greater flexibility in the delivery of 
aid, (b) provide recipient countries with more policy space, and (c) emphasize results, will by 
themselves be insufficient to ensure aid effectiveness unless recipient countries adopt 
complementary measures. These measures include enhancing domestic capacity to implement 
sophisticated projects and creating an appropriate economic environment for the economy to 
flourish.  
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In the past, Bangladesh‘s domestic capacity constraints; inability to create an equitable, 
transparent, and accountable governance structure; and the absence of a policy environment 
conducive to business growth undermined it efforts to achieve more rapid economic 
development. Even though Bangladesh made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy 
more than a decade ago, it continues to be a fledgling, illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997). It 
turned out to be a ―tyranny of the majority‖ (de Tocqueville 1969) that permitted few genuine 
economic freedoms, spawned massive corruption and rent-seeking and allowed little room for 
economic talents to flourish. The governance problem was greatly compounded by the absence 
of enlightened leadership with a grand vision and a sophisticated understanding of the economic 
development process, the leadership traits that are particularly germane during the current period 
of rapid globalization.  
 
The governance issues notwithstanding, Bangladesh has attained a measure of success in many 
areas of the economy, which is a testament to ordinary people‘s entrepreneurial abilities and the 
vigor and dynamism of civil society organizations. However, the requirements of governance 
vary from one stage of development to the next, and many aspects of governance that were 
unimportant in the past are likely to become more important as the economy becomes poised to 
make the transition from being predominantly rural and agricultural to urban and industrial. The 
hope is that the new leadership that has recently come into power will be more enlightened than 
past leadership, that the governance structure will evolve to meet the requirements of the 
economy, and that the policy environment will improve in step with the changing exigencies of 
the economy. If this happens, foreign aid could be an enormous catalyst for economic 
development and poverty may become a thing of the past much sooner than the early 
prognosticators of doom had ever imagined.  
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